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ANDREW FELTENSTEIN and SALEH M. NSOULI*
This paper analyzes issues concerning the speed of adjustment and sequencing of
reforms in a transition economy. It presents a dynamic general equilibrium model
parameterized with Chinese data. The model is used to generate different policy
simulations that highlight the importance of the policy instruments used during the
transition period. The simulations consider privatization, tariff reform, and deval-
uation, as well as alternative speeds of introducing these policies. They show that
different speeds of adjustment, as well as sequencing of reforms, will have very dif-
ferent implications for macroeconomic aggregates. [JEL D58, 21]
T
his paper analyzes the implications of alternative paths of economic reform in
the context of an economy with a large public sector that is being transformed
to become more market oriented. Two alternative paths to reform can be envis-
aged. First, the country can move gradually by selectively introducing reforms and
spacing them over time. Second, the country can pursue a “big-bang” approach,
under which all reforms are immediately and simultaneously introduced.
No general consensus has emerged on whether the “big-bang” approach to
reform is superior or inferior to a gradualist approach. Further, the order in which
reforms should be undertaken has remained a matter of debate.1 This paper exam-
ines the economic setting in China, the country to which the analysis is applied.
We  develop a dynamic general equilibrium model that is used to analyze the
effects of different speeds and sequencing of reforms. The model is solved numer-
ically, permitting us to carry out simulations for different policies. Finally, we con-
clude by drawing some policy conclusions from the simulations. 
*Andrew Feltenstein is Assistant Director in the IMF Institute and Saleh M. Nsouli is Deputy Director
in the IMF Institute. We would like to thank Stanley Black, Ralph Chami, Era Dabla-Norris, Norbert
Funke, Mohsin Khan, and Munir Rached for helpful comments and suggestions.
1For a detailed discussion of the issues and an overview of the literature, see Nsouli, Rached, and
Funke (2002).The paper focuses on only three types of policies that might be used to imple-
ment reforms. These are the privatization of publicly owned capital, the devalua-
tion of a currency, and reductions in tariff rates. We do not address the general
issue of just how general reform should be, nor do we consider many possible
policies and reforms. 
I. The Reform Setting and Model Intent
The model we use is applied to China. China is quite possibly the best example
among formerly planned economies of the use of gradualism in introducing eco-
nomic reforms. In this section, we provide some background information on the
Chinese reform process. There is a general theme that connects most of the ele-
ments in this process, namely that there has been a move toward the decentraliza-
tion of economic decision making and toward the opening of the economy.
In the early 1950s, the Soviet model of central planning shaped the struc-
ture of the Chinese economy. The central authority exercised direct administra-
tive control over local governments through various mechanisms. The central
authorities also directly controlled major enterprises, distributed funds, and
supervised fixed investment through a centralized budgetary allocation. At the
same time, production was carried on entirely through state-owned enterprises
and collectives, the exchange rate was maintained at an artificially overvalued
level, and the economy was closed, through a system of quantitative restrictions
and prohibitive tariffs.
Concentration of power at the center reduced the initiative of local govern-
ments and hindered production, leading, in 1957, to the move to reform by decen-
tralizing. A wave of recentralization, however, began in the early 1960s, when
almost all large and medium-sized enterprises were returned to the central author-
ity. A new decentralization movement started in 1964 and continued throughout the
Cultural Revolution period. In the 1970s, most central authority over enterprises
was transferred to local governments, which were allowed to retain enterprise
depreciation funds. At the same time, the gradual movement toward privatization
began, as did the slow opening of the economy to foreign trade and the corre-
sponding devaluation of the exchange rate.
Before 1979, China’s budgetary policy essentially consisted of generalized
tax collection and profit remittances controlled by the central government and
then redistributed as needed to the provinces. This system was changed in the
1980 intergovernmental reform, under which different jurisdictions were
assigned different expenditure responsibilities and were also made responsible
for collecting necessary revenues and managing their own budgets. Regions
that raised more revenues than were necessary were permitted to retain the
excess, giving them an incentive to increase revenue collection. This ability to
retain revenues was especially attractive to newly privatized state-owned enter-
prises, which now were able to take advantage of locally provided public
infrastructure. At the same time, decentralization was supported by the gradual
opening of foreign markets and sequenced devaluations of the exchange rate.
All of these changes tended to permit newly privatized firms to operate in a
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tralization process.2
Economic decentralization in the postreform period has explicitly aimed at
introducing a free market economy by gradually removing price controls.
Decentralized resource allocation allowed an increase in investment in efficient
non-state firms, leading to a rise in aggregate economic growth. On the other hand,
productivity in the inefficient state sector lagged behind that in the non-state sec-
tor.3 In order to sustain public welfare, the central government found it necessary
to support the ailing state-owned enterprises. The relative inefficiency of state-
owned firms implies that they tend to be hurt by tariff relaxation more than do the
privatized, or non-state, enterprises. At the same time, they tend to benefit less
from devaluations. 
Against this background, we will consider three types of policy reforms in our
simulation analysis. Although there are many other reforms that can be examined,
these three should give some sense of the lessons to be drawn from our model. The
focus will be on reform policies relating to state enterprises, exchange rate policy,
and external sector liberalization. More specifically, in terms of the model we use,
the reforms are introduced as follows:
• Privatization of capital: Initially, the government owns capital, which is
sector specific. We assume that the private sector is more efficient than the
public sector. We allow privatization to be either gradually or immediately
introduced. 
• Devaluation: We start with an overvalued exchange rate. We then explore
two devaluation paths. At one extreme, there is an up-front devaluation,
while at the other, the devaluation is effected gradually through several dis-
crete steps. 
• Tariff reduction: We suppose that the economy has operated under a system of
high overall rates on import duties. We examine the effects of both gradual and
immediate tariff reductions. 
We should view our exercises as essentially forward looking for China. That
is, the reforms of the past 25 years have been quite different from those that we
will simulate. In particular, China has not made active use of exchange rate policy
in the past. Nor has there been a significant movement toward trade reform. In
addition, despite the privatization that has been carried out so far, most capital still
remains in the public sector. Hence, our exercises should be viewed as a quantita-
tive examination of certain possible policies rather than as a description of the
past. The main objective is to get a sense of the effects of different speeds and
sequences of reforms.
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2It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully analyze Chinese decentralization. For a review of
Chinese fiscal decentralization, see Bell, Khor, and Kochhar (1993), Blejer (1993), Lardy (1998), Tseng
and others (1994), Hofman (1993), World Bank (1994, 1996, 1997), and G. Ma (1995).  A broad histori-
cal, as well as analytical, survey of Chinese fiscal and macroeconomic policies is given in J. Ma (1997),
as well as in Broadman (1995) and Yusuf (1994).
3See Groves and others (1994), Dollar (1990), and Jefferson and Rawski (1994) for further discus-
sion of changes in Chinese productivity. The general relationship between fiscal policy and growth is
examined in Easterly and Rebelo (1993).II. Model Structure
This section develops the analytical structure of our model.4 Much of this struc-
ture is designed in order to permit a numerical implementation. It is also aimed at
reflecting certain stylized elements of the Chinese economy. Although we would
not claim that this model lends itself to goodness of fit estimations, we will cali-
brate the model’s endogenous macroeconomic outcomes to corresponding
Chinese historical data. The comparison of the simulated and historical data
should then serve to offer some confidence in both the structure and the parame-
terization of the model. 
Intuitive Background
Let us give a brief intuitive description of our model. This should help clarify the
technical description that we will present next. The model has n discrete time peri-
ods. All agents optimize in each period over a two-period time horizon. That is, in
period t they optimize given prices for periods t and t +1 and expectations for
prices for the future after t +1. When period t +2  arrives, agents re-optimize for
period t+2 and t+3,based on new information about period t+2. For example,
there may have been a change in fiscal parameters, such as tax or tariff rates, or an
exchange rate change. Thus the savings decision made in period t+1 may not give
an optimal allocation when period t+2 arrives. We should note that this does not
mean that expectations are incorrect. If there are no exogenous parameter changes,
then solving the two-period problem will be equivalent to solving the infinite hori-
zon problem.
We  wish to avoid having a perfect foresight model since it would tend to
underestimate the costs of gradual reform. The reason for this bias comes from the
fact that agents today would know about policy changes that might happen far in
the future, as would be the case under gradualism. Hence they would adjust today,
rather than have a set of imperfect adjustments over time. Thus there would never
be any “wrong” decisions, as might occur under a system of gradualism with
unknown future policies. In our framework the agents in the model correctly pre-
dict prices and quantities for the next period, but do not know what will happen
after that. Hence they optimize with perfect foresight for one period into the
future, but they base their expectations for the periods thereafter on the past. That
is, they use an adaptive expectations formulation.5
The model will have certain features that distinguish it from a standard repre-
sentation of a market economy. In particular, it has production by both the state
and private sectors. In general, we will suppose that the private sector profit max-
imizes, while the public sector has other goals, such as output or employment tar-
gets. A key feature of the transition period will be the privatization of public
production, via the transfer of capital to private firms. 
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4The dynamic structure of the model is derived from Blejer, Feldman, and Feltenstein (2002).
5Thus our structure would tend to generate less favorable outcomes for gradualism than would a per-
fect foresight model. It is our view, however, that this is a more realistic outcome than would be the case
with the perfect foresight results.Suppose, for simplicity, that there are two firms at the beginning of the transi-
tion period. One firm is publicly owned while the other is privately held. Both
firms produce current output via identical neoclassical production functions.
Hence the two firms differ only in the ownership of their initial capital stocks. We
also do not permit loss-making behavior by the publicly owned firm in its current
production. Rather, it faces a “hard” budget constraint. 
The firms do differ, however, in their investment behavior. The privately held
firm invests so as to equate the present value of the anticipated future stream of
earnings on new capital to the cost of borrowing needed to finance the investment.
This is thus normal market-determined investment that assumes free entry and
hence exhaustion of profit. The public firm, on the other hand, invests according
to instructions from the government. That is, it invests a nominal amount that is
not based on any economic reason but in reality would be based on a governmen-
tal decision that could be politically determined. Since there is normally pressure
on the public firm to invest, it does so beyond the optimal level, perhaps to sup-
port employment. Hence the public firm may find that the returns to its invest-
ments may not cover its interest obligations at some time in the future and it may
need to be financed by budget transfers from the government.
The government in our model is quite simple. It makes current expenditures on
pure public goods, buying inputs of capital and labor from the private sector. It also
invests in public capital, such as electricity generation or transportation. This public
infrastructure may augment the efficiency of private production. Our government
also carries out privatization policies. Although, in reality, privatization of state
enterprises may be carried out by the sale of equity, here we make a simplification.
We suppose that the government privatizes state enterprises by simply giving pub-
licly owned capital to the private sector. This reflects the notion that there are no
developed capital markets in which it would be possible to sell off public enterprises.
Finally, the government finances itself by issuing bonds. These bonds are the same
as those issued by the private sector, so public and private sectors compete for pri-
vate savings.6 Part of the issuance of debt may be monetized by the central bank.
Let us suppose, again for simplicity, that there are two consumer types, one
urban and one rural. Rural labor is used in agricultural production, while urban
labor is used in all other types of production. Both consumers maximize intertem-
poral utility functions with transaction demands for money. They save by holding
bonds, either domestic or foreign currency–denominated. The rest of the world is
represented by a single export equation. 
Finally, equilibrium in the model is determined as market clearing for goods
and financial markets in each period. Thus our model differs from that of a
dynamic market economy in only a few key ways. Capital is both publicly and pri-
vately owned, and public investment is determined by political rather than market
parameters. Hence the public sector may find itself financing investment by state
enterprises. Privatization may be carried out, and is done so by giving the publicly
owned capital to the private sector, rather than by carrying out sales of new equity.
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6The government may also carry out foreign borrowing to finance the deficit. The size of the foreign
loan is exogenously determined by the lender.Let us now turn to a formal description of our model. We will do so while




There are eight factors of production and three types of financial assets:
1–5. Capital types 9. Foreign currency
6. Urban labor 10. Rural labor
7. Domestic currency 11. Land
8. Bank deposits
The five types of capital correspond to the major nonagricultural productive sec-
tors from the national accounts. We wish to avoid using a single, perfectly mobile,
capital type since it would generate overly rapid sectoral adjustments. The initial
ownership of each capital type is divided between the public and private sector.
Each of these factors and financial assets is replicated in each period and, accord-
ingly, has a price in each period. 
An input-output matrix, At, is used to determine intermediate and final produc-
tion in the private sector in period t. Corresponding to each sector in the input-output
matrix, sector-specific value added is produced using capital and urban labor for the
nonagricultural sectors, and land and rural labor in agriculture. Agriculture uses land
and rural labor, and all other sectors use one of the five capital types plus urban labor. 





Li be the inputs of capital and urban labor to the jth nonagricultural sector in
period i. Let YGi be the outstanding stock of government infrastructure in period i.
The production of value added in sector j in period i is then given by
(1)
We suppose that public infrastructure may act as a productivity increment to pri-
vate production. Sector j pays income taxes on inputs of capital and labor, given
by tKij, tLij,r espectively, in period i.
We suppose that each type of capital is produced via a sector-specific invest-
ment technology that uses inputs of capital and labor to produce new capital. Both
the public and private sector invest and produce capital. Investment that is carried
out by the private sector is entirely financed by domestic borrowing.7 Let us define
the following notation. 
Let CHi be the cost of producing the quantity of capital Hi in period i. Let ri
denote the interest rate in period i. The return to capital in period i is denoted by
PKi. The price of money in period i is given by PMi, and δ represents the rate of
depreciation of capital.




Gi = ( ) ,, .
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7We assume that all foreign borrowing is carried out by the government, so that, implicitly, the gov-
ernment is borrowing for the private investor but the debt thereby incurred is publicly guaranteed.  The cost of borrowing must equal the present value of the return on new cap-
ital. Hence,
(2)
where rj is the interest rate in period j.
Public sector
We  take a very simple view of public sector production. We will suppose that
state-owned enterprises have the same production technology for intermediate and
final goods as do those firms in the private sector. Hence there are no efficiency
gains in current production if production is transferred from the public to the pri-
vate sector. We make this assumption for essentially data-based reasons. It will not
be possible, using Chinese data, to estimate separate production functions for pub-
lic and private sector firms.
We do, however, assume that public sector investment is different than private
sector investment. In particular, public sector firms do not invest in an optimal fash-
ion, as in equation (3). Rather, the government allocates an arbitrary amount of rev-
enues to investment in each sector. Suppose then that the government decides to
spend GINVi on public enterprise capital formation in period i. Let public enterprise
firm j have a Cobb-Douglas investment function with coefficients γj,1–γj.
We suppose that the government allocates GINVi to the different public enter-
prises according to an arbitrary set of policy weights ηij in period i. Thus the gov-
ernment spends ηijGINVi on sector j’s investment in period i. Accordingly, sector
j uses γjηijGINVi/PKij units of capital as inputs to investment in period i, and
(1–γj)ηijGINVi/PLij units of labor. The capital thus produced is then available in
period i+1. 
Thus, public investment in public enterprises is determined purely by policy
considerations, rather than intertemporal profit maximization. In addition, this
capital formation may be financed by taxes or by borrowing, unlike private invest-
ment, and it may, in fact, be loss-making over time, even in the absence of shocks.
That is, the public sector may overinvest for noneconomic reasons. In addition, the
public sector’s investment is not forward looking in the sense of maximizing a
stream of profits.
Privatization
We will implement a simple form of privatization of public enterprises. We will
assume that, when the government privatizes a state enterprise, it simply gives the
capital of the state enterprise to the corresponding private firm. This privatization
can be partial. In other words, the government gives a portion of the publicly owned
capital to the corresponding private firm and retains a fraction for itself. We thus
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464allocated to the private sector, there is a corresponding reduction in public capital
expenditure on state-owned enterprises.
Consumption
There are two types of consumers, representing rural and urban labor. We suppose
that the two consumer classes have differing Cobb-Douglas demands. The con-
sumers also differ in their initial allocations of factors and financial assets. The
consumers maximize intertemporal utility functions, which have as arguments the
levels of consumption and leisure in each of the two periods. We permit rural-
urban migration, which depends upon the relative rural and urban wage rate. The
consumers maximize these utility functions subject to intertemporal budget con-
straints. The consumer saves by holding money, domestic bank deposits, and for-
eign currency. He requires money for transactions purposes, but his demand for
money is sensitive to changes in the inflation rate. 
The specification of the consumers’ maximization problem is given in the
Appendix.
The Government
The government collects personal income, corporate profit, and value-added taxes,
as well as import duties. It pays for the production of public goods, as well as for
subsidies. Unlike the government of a market economy, it also pays for investment
in state enterprises and collects revenue from the returns to the capital of those
enterprises. If the state enterprises have losses, the government subsidizes them. In
addition, the government must cover both domestic and foreign interest obliga-
tions on public debt. The deficit of the central government in period 1, D1, is then
given by
(3)
where S1 represents subsidies given in period 1, G1 is spending on goods and ser-
vices, while the next two terms reflect domestic and foreign interest obligations of
the government, based on its initial stocks of debt. T1 represents tax revenues,
while the final term represents the income from publicly owned capital that
accrues to the government. The term PRIVj1 represents the degree to which public
capital in sector j is privatized in period 1. Thus if the sector were fully privatized
we would have PRIVj1=1. Any partial privatization would be reflected by a value
less than 1. 
The resulting deficit is financed by a combination of monetary expansion, as
well as domestic and foreign borrowing. If ∆yBG1 represents the face value of
domestic bonds sold by the government in period 1, and CF1 represents the dollar
value of its foreign borrowing, then its budget deficit in period 2 is given by
(4) DGSryB reCB TP K PRIV BG F F F Kj
j
Gj j 22 2 2 1 0 1 2 1 02 2
1
5
22 1 =+ + + ( )++ ( )−− − ( )
= ∑ ∆ ,
DGSr Br e B TP K PRIV FF K j
j
Gj j 11 1 1 01 1 0 1 1
1
5
11 1 =+ + + − − − ( )
= ∑ ,
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465where r2(∆yBG1+B0) represents the interest obligations on its initial domestic debt
plus borrowing from period 1, and e2rF2(CF1+B0) is the interest payment on the
initial stock of foreign debt plus period 1 foreign borrowing. As before, the final
term is the revenue from state enterprises after privatization.
The government finances its budget deficit by a combination of monetization,
domestic borrowing, and foreign borrowing. We assume that foreign borrowing in
period i, CFi,i s exogenously determined by the lender. The government then deter-
mines the face value of its bond sales in period i, ∆yBGi, and finances the remain-
der of the budget deficit by monetization. Hence,
Di = PBi∆yBGi + PMi∆yMi + eiCFi.
The Foreign Sector
The foreign sector is represented by a simple export equation in which aggregate
demand for exports is determined by domestic and foreign price indices, as well
as world income. The specific form of the export equation is
The left-hand side of the equation represents the change in the dollar value of
exports in period i, πi is inflation in the domestic price index, ∆ei is the percentage
change in the exchange rate, and πFi is the foreign rate of inflation. Also, ∆ywi rep-
resents the percentage change in world income, denominated in dollars. Finally, σ1
and σ2 are corresponding elasticities. 
Equilibrium 
An equilibrium in our model is defined as market clearing in the markets for fac-
tors and financial assets, replicated in each time period. Factor markets are capital
(five types), urban and rural labor, and land. Financial assets are domestic currency,
domestic bank deposits, and foreign currency. We use a solution method that is
based on an approximating fixed-point algorithm to solve for the equilibrium.
III. Data Sources for China
A variety of data sources for China are used to parameterize the model. The tech-
nology for intermediate and final production is given by the 1995 Chinese input-
output matrix. This is taken from the 1998 China Statistical Yearbook, and
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4665. Other Manufacturing
6. Production of Electricity
7. Gas, Coal, and Petroleum
8. Chemicals
9. Building Materials and Nonmetallic Minerals
10. Metal Products
11. Machinery and Equipment
12. Construction
13. Transport and Telecommunications
14. Commerce
15. Public Utilities
16. Banking and Insurance
17. Other Services
In order to correspond to our different capital types, we have assumed that these







We derive indirect taxes from the input-output matrix, using the coefficient
for Net Taxes on Production. In order to derive import coefficients for the input-
output matrix, as well as import tariff rates, we take a somewhat involved
approach. This approach is necessary since the Chinese input-output matrix does
not include import coefficients. Here, as with all other derived data, we take our
figures from 1995 in order to correspond to the input-output matrix. We assume
that all inputs are used as intermediate and primary inputs to production, since we
lack the information to derive imports used for final consumption. We use Table
16.5 from the 1998 China Statistical Yearbook to obtain sectoral imports for five
sectors. These are (1) Agriculture, (2) Mining, (3) Foodstuff, (4) Textiles, and (5)
Other Manufacturing. These are given in U.S. dollars, and we use an exchange
rate of 8.35 yuan/$ to calculate domestic currency figures. Corresponding input-
output (IO) coefficients are then derived by dividing sectoral imports by the total
inputs to sectoral production from the IO matrix. 
We need to derive the effective rates of direct taxation for enterprises. Table
7.8 of the China Statistical Yearbook gives total revenues transferred to the gov-
ernment by state-owned enterprises (SOE) and collectively owned enterprises
(COE). Table 2.10 gives total income from industry, and from this we derive a tax
rate of 4.8 percent that is levied on inputs of capital and labor to all nonagricul-
tural sectors. We also need government current and capital expenditures, as per-
centages of GDP. Nominal expenditure is taken from Table 7.4, while nominal
GDP comes from Table 2.13. From these we obtain a figure for capital expendi-
tures of 2.9 percent of GDP, and for current expenditures on goods and services of
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which are generated endogenously by the model. 
In order to parameterize the consumer’s problem, we need several types of
data. We need utility weights for the different consumer demand functions, as well
as initial allocations of factors and financial assets. In order to derive utility
weights, we use Table 3.18, the final use part of the IO matrix. This gives expen-
ditures on each of the 17 sectors by agricultural and non-agricultural households.
From these, we obtain utility weights for the two consumer categories. 
Initial allocations of capital are given by the sectoral operation surpluses, that
is, returns to capital, from the IO matrix. Similarly, allocations of labor are given
by compensation of laborers across sectors. Thus we define a physical unit of cap-
ital and labor as that which earned one yuan in 1995. Initial allocations of money
are taken from International Financial Statistics (IFS) as M1 for 1994. Initial allo-
cations of bank deposits are also derived from IFS as 1994 holdings of quasi-
money. Finally, we assume that there are no holdings by the two domestic
consumer types of foreign currency. The initial holding of foreign currency by the
rest of the world, that is, the foreign consumer, is taken to be the 1994 value of
exports. This, in turn, is taken from Table 16.3 of the China Statistical Yearbook. 
IV. Simulations
In this section we will derive certain conclusions about the effect of alternative
paths for the economy, corresponding to different assumptions regarding policy
changes and reforms. 
Baseline Scenario
The baseline scenario assumes no reform actions are taken. We use the period
1990–95 for the simulation in order to make a comparison with theoretical outcomes.
Table 1 gives the macroeconomic outcomes over a six-year simulation period.
Under the baseline scenario, real GDP grows at an average annual rate of 7.0
percent over the period of the simulation. At the same time there is a 12.2 percent
average inflation rate over the time period. If we compare the baseline scenario for
the period 1990–95 with historical Chinese data, the simulated real growth rate is
lower than the historical rate of 12.0 percent, while the simulated inflation rate is
slightly lower than the historical rate of 12.9 percent. At the same time, the bud-
get over the first four years of the simulation is reasonably close to Chinese his-
torical outcomes. After four years, the simulated budget deficit is higher than
historical levels, largely because of our assumption of a fixed real spending by the
government. Finally, the simulated interest rate, after the first two years, is broadly
in line with historical values. Until the final two periods, our simulated trade bal-
ance is higher than the actual levels.
We do not attempt to claim any statistical “goodness of fit” properties for our
simulation exercises. That is, there is no econometric comparison between the his-
torical outcomes and the corresponding endogenous outcomes generated by the
general equilibrium model. Rather, we wish only to show general similarities
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approach. We lack enough observations to derive meaningful statistical properties.
Additionally, Chinese macro data reflect a variety of price and interest rate con-
trols that we do not include (see Feltenstein and Ha, 1991).8 Also, we do not
attempt to incorporate all historical changes in exogenous parameters that actually
occurred in China during the period in question. Finally, we are not trying to use
the model for predictive purposes. Rather, we wish to be able to make qualitative
judgments about the possible effects of counterfactual policies.
The last line in the table represents the utility levels of the two consumers,
which are normalized to 100 for the baseline scenario. The utilities are calculated
as the present value of the stream of consumption over the time periods of the sim-
ulation. The calculation is made ex post: that is, it is made by calculating the value
of a utility function of the following form:
where δ is the rate of time preference. The values of {xi}, representing vectors of
consumption in each period, are given by the solutions to the intertemporal maxi-
mization problem over T periods. The utility function, which is thus time separa-
ble, is Cobb-Douglas in each period. That is,
Thus, the consumer maximizes his utility with a two-period time horizon and
expectations about the future thereafter. Because unexpected policies may be
xx x x ii i i N i
N == ∑ 12
12 1
αα α α ... ,  where   .
i
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Table 1. China: Baseline Scenario1
Period 123456
Price level 100 111.6 123.7 137.5 147.4 177.6
(100) (103.5) (110.0) (126.1) (156.6) (183.1)
Real GDP 100 107.6 114.5 123.1 131.1 140.3
(100) (109.2) (124.7) (141.5) (159.4) (176.2)
Budget (in percent of GDP) 0.7 –0.2 –3.1 –3.3 –6.3 –6.0
(–0.2) (–1.1) (–1.0) (–0.8) (–1.2) (–1.0)
Interest rate 1.8 3.4 4.7 11.3 9.9 14.8
(7.9) (7.2) (7.2) (10.1) (10.1) (10.4)
Trade balance (in percent of GDP) 11.1 11.7 7.3 8.2 4.9 3.8
(2.8) (2.9) (1.1) (–2.0) (1.3) (1.7)
Utility of consumer 1 = 100, utility of consumer 2 = 100
Source: Authors’ simulation results.
1The figures in parentheses are historical values taken from the IMF’s International Financial
Statistics.
8See also Qian and Xu (1998) for a discussion of some of the results of regimes with price controls
as well as soft budget constraints.introduced over time, his realized consumption may be different from his
intended consumption. Hence the value of his utility function, calculated using
realized consumption, may also be different than would have been the case had
he achieved his planned consumption levels. Accordingly, our utility levels, if this
were a single representative agent model, could be thought of as the present value
of a real income index.
While we would not claim that our parameterized model offers a statistically
significant rendition of Chinese reality, it provides a basis for carrying out the pol-
icy simulations for purposes of illustrating the different effects of alternative
speeds and sequencing of reforms.
Privatization
Two initial simulations are carried out in which privatization is introduced at dif-
ferent speeds. In the first, there is a gradual process of privatization, while in the
second there is complete privatization in the first period. In carrying out privatiza-
tion, it is assumed that public state-owned enterprise capital is simply given to the
private sector, and that privatization is carried out uniformly across sectors. 
To simulate gradual privatization, it is assumed that 30 percent of state-owned
enterprise capital is given to the private sector in period 1, 30 percent more in
period 3, and the final 40 percent in period 5. Thus, in the last two periods of the
simulation there is full privatization. The outcomes are given in Table 2.
There are a number of differences compared with the baseline scenario. First,
there is a small but uniform increase in the price level in all periods. As the pub-
lic capital stock is privatized, there is a corresponding decline in the rate of public
investment, which is not fully picked up by the private sector. The resulting lower
capital stocks cause the general price level to rise. There is an initial decline in real
GDP, due to the decline in aggregate investment. Over time, however, there is a
more efficient distribution of sectoral investment by the private sector, leading to
an eventual rise in real GDP to 1.4 percent above the baseline scenario in period
6. There is also an improvement in the budget position, relative to the baseline sce-
nario, as the loss in public revenue from privatization is more than made up by the
reduction in public investment spending.
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Table 2. China: Gradual Privatization
Period 123456
Price level 101.9 114.1 124.5 153.1 153.8 187.6
Real GDP 98.8 106.4 113.7 121.9 133.3 142.2
Budget deficit (in percent of GDP) 1.7 0.7 –1.5 –2.0 –4.2 –3.9
Interest rate 4.0 6.8 10.7 14.0 12.4 20.9
Trade balance (in percent of GDP) 10.9 11.7 7.3 5.5 3.3 2.0
Utility of consumer 1 = 102.3, utility of consumer 2 = 90.5
Source: Authors’ simulation results.“BIG BANG”VERSUS GRADUALISM IN ECONOMIC REFORMS
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The current account deteriorates slightly, compared with the baseline scenario,
in line with the increased appreciation of the exchange rate, and the nominal inter-
est rate is higher, as private investment eventually increases in the new environ-
ment. The resulting borrowing requirements of the private sector bring about the
increase in the interest rate. Finally, the urban consumer is relatively better off than
before, while the rural consumer is worse off. This is because the increase in inter-
est rates has created a positive wealth effect for the urban consumer, who owns rel-
atively more financial assets than does the rural consumer. Accordingly, the urban
consumer increases his demand, thereby driving up prices. The rural consumer
suffers from these higher prices, and hence realizes a lower utility level. 
Suppose that, instead of gradual privatization, an immediate full privatization
takes place in period 1. Thus, all the capital of the state-owned enterprises is given
to the private sector at the beginning of period 1. Table 3 gives the outcome of sim-
ulating a full privatization.
A number of interesting observations, compared with a process of gradual pri-
vatization, can be made. First, inflation is significantly higher in the initial peri-
ods, with the price levels gradually converging under the two scenarios over the
six periods. The higher inflation rates, particularly in the earlier periods, reflect the
initial drop in capital and real GDP as the government’s cutback on public invest-
ment is not picked up initially by the private sector. Second, there is a further
decline in real GDP in the initial two periods, because the elimination of public
sector investment is not immediately made up for by a corresponding increase in
private output. However, by period 3, the more efficient allocation of private, as
compared to public, investment leads real GDP to rise beyond the level achieved
under the gradual privatization scenario. Indeed, by period 6, real GDP is 3.2 per-
cent higher than under gradual privatization. The budget deficit deteriorates,
reflecting the higher interest rates in this case, as compared to the previous case.
These higher rates are themselves caused by the fact that all investment is now car-
ried out by the private sector, starting in period 1. Since private investment is
entirely financed by borrowing, unlike public investment, which may be partially
financed by monetization, the increased borrowing drives interest rates up. There
is a further deterioration in the current account balance, as the higher inflation
rates lead to a greater overvaluation of the currency under the fixed exchange rate.
Both consumers realize higher levels of utility, as the overvaluation of the currency
Table 3. China: Immediate Full Privatization
Period 123456
Price level 112.6 136.2 132.5 161.6 155.2 188.6
Real GDP 95.2 102.3 116.6 124.3 138.0 146.7
Budget deficit (in percent of GDP) 3.9 2.5 –1.7 –1.9 –6.1 –5.3
Interest rate 11.5 14.5 13.5 21.7 15.0 27.7
Trade balance (in percent of GDP) 9.4 7.8 5.0 3.6 2.1 1.1
Utility of consumer 1 = 108.5, utility of consumer 2 = 137.3
Source: Authors’ simulation results.has a positive effect on consumption of both consumers. We should note that the
deterioration of the trade balance indicates that this higher level of consumption
may not be sustainable in the long run.9
The basic conclusion of these two simulations is that, on balance, an immedi-
ate privatization has a more positive impact on consumers than a gradual one.
However, in both cases, the increased deterioration of the current account relative
to the baseline scenario, because of the increasingly overvalued exchange rate,
raises questions of policy sustainability in the absence of exchange rate reduction.
Exchange Rate Policy
In view of the results of the two privatization simulations, this section presents the
results of simulations combining an adjustment in the exchange rate with privatiza-
tion. To examine a “gradual-gradual” approach, assume there is a gradual devaluation
along with a gradual privatization. Suppose that there is a 5 percentage point devalu-
ation in each period starting with period 1, and that a gradual privatization is imple-
mented consistent with the process shown in Table 2. The results are given in Table 4.
There are a number of differences compared with Table 2. There is a signifi-
cant increase in the price level, reflecting the effect of the devaluation, as well as
a marginal increase in real GDP, due to the expenditure-switching effect of the
devaluation. The budget deficit does not change much, as the increased costs in
foreign debt are balanced by increased revenues from import duties. As expected,
the current account balance improves, as the overvaluation is progressively cor-
rected. Interest rates do not change much in nominal terms and there are no sig-
nificant changes in the utility levels of the urban and rural consumers. Finally, we
should note that the main reason for the relatively small changes in real output in
this simulation, as compared to Table 2, comes from the fact that the inputs of
imports into domestic production in the Chinese input-output matrix are quite low.
Hence there is only a slight impact on domestic output caused by the devaluation. 
Would gradual privatization with up-front devaluation be more appropriate?
Thus, instead of a 5 percent annual devaluation, assume there is an initial 30 per-
cent devaluation. Table 5 gives the results of the simulation.
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Table 4. China: Gradual Privatization and 5 Percent Annual Devaluation
Period 123456
Price level 104.3 119.9 135.0 165.0 174.3 215.5
Real GDP 99.0 106.8 115.0 122.9 134.3 143.6
Budget deficit (in percent of GDP) 1.6 0.5 –1.5 –2.2 –4.1 –4.0
Interest rate 5.2 7.2 11.2 13.6 12.6 18.9
Trade balance (in percent of GDP) 11.7 13.7 8.7 7.9 5.5 4.8
Utility of consumer 1 = 101.3, utility of consumer 2 = 99.1
Source: Authors’ simulation results.
9One might analyze the long-run sustainability of the current account by checking running simula-
tions over a considerably longer time period than the six periods in this study. “BIG BANG”VERSUS GRADUALISM IN ECONOMIC REFORMS
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Compared with Table 4, there is a small boost to real GDP, but, as expected,
inflation is initially higher, but tapers off with the price levels under the two sce-
narios gradually converging. The budget deficits and interest rates do not change
much. However, the current account position, at least in the initial periods,
improves significantly, but worsens in the last period. Because of the higher price
level and the unchanged real GDP, both rural and urban consumers end up being
worse off than under the gradual devaluation scenario. 
Let us now examine two possible combinations of immediate privatization—
with a gradual devaluation and with an up-front devaluation. Table 6 gives the
results of a gradual devaluation with immediate privatization. 
It is useful to compare Table 6 with Table 4. There is a relative increase in
inflation but a relative fall in real GDP in the first two periods, reflecting the fall
in public investment. In the last four periods private productivity catches up,
reflected in a higher real GDP level, and a dampening in inflation. The budget
improves initially, but starts deteriorating, due to the increase in the nominal inter-
est rate. The real interest rate rises as private investment increases, and the current
account deteriorates as private consumption also rises. Both rural and urban con-
sumers are better off than under the gradual privatization scenario.
Let us turn to an alternative policy path. Consider a one-step devaluation at the
beginning, together with an immediate privatization. The outcomes are given in
Table 5. China: Gradual Privatization Plus 30 Percent Up-Front Devaluation
Period 123456
Price level 114.6 133.0 144.1 175.7 181.5 222.7
Real GDP 100.0 107.2 115.4 123.1 134.0 142.7
Budget deficit (in percent of GDP) 1.1 –0.1 –1.7 –2.4 –4.2 –4.0
Interest rate 6.1 5.1 10.8 18.6 11.9 17.8
Trade balance (in percent of GDP) 15.1 14.8 10.0 8.4 5.3 3.8
Utility of consumer 1 = 100.0, utility of consumer 2 = 89.6
Source: Authors’ simulation results.
Table 6. China: Immediate Privatization Plus 5 Percent Annual Devaluation
Period 123456
Price level 117.3 143.7 143.6 177.9 175.1 216.6
Real GDP 95.3 102.5 117.2 125.0 139.3 148.2
Budget deficit (in percent of GDP) 3.8 2.2 –1.8 –2.1 –5.9 –5.3
Interest rate 12.0 15.3 14.1 20.9 15.3 25.0
Trade balance (in percent of GDP) 9.6 9.0 6.4 5.7 4.3 3.7
Utility of consumer 1 = 106.9, utility of consumer 2 = 123.1
Source: Authors’ simulation results.Table 7. Compared with the previous scenario (Table 6), we see that the price level
is generally higher and real GDP and the budget do not change significantly. Real
interest rates are lower, as the devaluation has reduced private investment, thereby
reducing borrowing requirements. In addition, the current account surplus
improves marginally. The higher price levels, however, are reflected in lower wel-
fare for both consumers. 
Tariff Reform
Two simulations regarding alternate tariff reform paths are carried out, involving
a gradual and an up-front elimination of tariffs. The first simulation (Table 8) sup-
poses that tariff reform is introduced gradually. Assume that, in the first two peri-
ods, tariff rates stay at their historical levels. In the remaining four periods, they
are reduced by 20, 40, 70, and 100 percent of their initial values. Hence by period
6 they are at 0 percent. Table 8 gives the results of this simulation.
The second simulation assumes the elimination of tariff rates in the first
period. The results are given in Table 9. 
The outcomes in both simulations are essentially the same as those in Table 1.
These suggest that tariff reform, taken alone, appears to have little impact, whether
done gradually or in one step. We should, however, qualify our results. The effective
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Table 7. China: Immediate Privatization Plus 30 Percent Initial Devaluation
Period 123456
Price level 129.8 156.7 155.6 190.6 184.9 226.0
Real GDP 96.2 103.0 117.4 124.9 138.9 147.5
Budget deficit (in percent of GDP) 3.1 1.7 –2.2 –2.4 –6.1 –5.5
Interest rate 12.5 14.3 13.3 19.2 14.2 24.0
Trade balance (in percent of GDP) 12.6 11.0 7.3 5.8 3.9 2.6
Utility of consumer 1 = 105.9, utility of consumer 2 = 114.2
Source: Authors’ simulation results.
Table 8. China: Gradual Tariff Reform
Period 123456
Price level 100 111.6 123.9 137.8 147.6 178.4
Real GDP 100 107.6 114.5 123.8 131.2 140.2
Budget (in percent of GDP) 0.7 –0.2 –3.2 –3.4 –6.6 –6.4
Interest rate 1.7 3.4 4.6 11.2 9.3 15.2
Trade balance (in percent of GDP) 11.1 11.7 7.3 8.3 5.0 3.8
Utility of consumer 1 = 99.1, utility of consumer 2 = 100.6
Source: Authors’ simulation results.average tariff rate that we have estimated is only 2.7 percent in period 1. Hence the
elimination of tariffs would have relatively little impact, at least initially, on prices.
At the same time, the coefficients of imports in the Chinese input-output matrix are
quite small and, in fact, imports are used as inputs to production in only six sectors.
Accordingly, there is little linkage between imports and domestic production.10
The Two Extremes
In this section we consider two cases involving several policy instruments. In both,
simulations, privatization, tariff reform, and devaluation are undertaken, with the
only difference being in the speed with which these actions are taken.
Table 10 gives the results of a “big-bang” approach involving an up-front full
elimination of tariffs, full privatization, and a 30 percent devaluation. 
These results provide an interesting contrast to the baseline scenario (Table
1) and give an indication of how the addition of tariff reform in a package affects
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Table 9. China: Immediate Tariff Reform
Period 123456
Price level 100.0 111.3 123.5 139.3 144.9 179.0
Real GDP 100.0 107.8 114.5 122.9 131.6 140.4
Budget (in percent of GDP) 0.4 –0.5 –3.5 –3.7 –6.7 –6.4
Interest rate 2.1 4.0 5.4 11.6 11.0 16.0
Trade balance (in percent of GDP) 11.5 12.3 7.6 8.1 5.4 3.6
Utility of consumer 1 = 101.2, utility of consumer 2 = 101.3
Source: Authors’ simulation results.
Table 10. China: The Big-Bang Approach1
Period 123456
Price level 130.4 157 .3 156.2 191.4 185.7 227.0
Real GDP 95.9 102.8 117.5 124.9 139.0 147.7
Budget deficit (in percent of GDP) 2.4 1.4 –2.6 –2.8 –6.7 –6.0
Interest rate 12.4 14.6 13.7 20.2 14.9 25.4
Trade balance (in percent of GDP) 12.9 11.2 7.4 5.8 3.9 2.6
Utility of consumer 1 = 107.4, utility of consumer 2 = 116.4
Source: Authors’ simulation results.
1Immediate privatization, tariff reform, and 30 percent devaluation.
10Trade barriers in China are incorporated as nontariff barriers rather than as high tariff rates.  Hence
trade liberalization should really be studied as a reduction in quantitative restrictions.  Such simulations
are, however, beyond the scope of our current study.welfare (compared to Table 6). First, compared with the baseline scenario, real
GDP is lower in the two first periods, but then rises. The price level is higher
throughout. After improving, the current account position deteriorates, as the
once-and-for-all effect of the devaluation is gradually eroded. Overall, both con-
sumers are better off, benefiting from the reform package. Second, the welfare
effect of up-front tariff reform combined with other policies is somewhat greater
than the up-front tariff reform alone. 
Table 11 gives the results of a gradual approach to a reform package, involv-
ing gradual privatization, tariff reform, and devaluation phased in the same man-
ner as in earlier simulations.
Compared with the big-bang approach, this table indicates that gradualism,
although resulting in less of a contraction in real GDP in the first two periods,
yields lower real GDP levels in the subsequent periods. Partly because of that, both
consumers are distinctly less well off in terms of their welfare than under the big-
bang approach. In fact, the gradual approach results in minor welfare improve-
ments relative to the baseline scenario only to the urban consumer. 
V. Conclusion
The results of the simulations (summarized in Table 12) illustrate the complexities
of the issues involved in deciding on the speed of adjustment and sequencing of
reforms. Much depends on the objectives being sought, the time frame, and the
sustainability of the macroeconomic situation. Nonetheless, certain conclusions
can be drawn from the simulations.
In looking at complete policy packages, the big-bang approach is better from
a welfare point of view: both consumers are better off under a package where
adjustment and reform policies reinforce each other. Although under the big-bang
approach the drop in real GDP is initially greater than under the gradual approach,
real GDP rises to higher levels in subsequent periods. However, the current
account position remains better under the gradual approach partly because the big-
bang approach generates worse budgetary outcomes and higher nominal interest
rates for most of the period.
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Table 11. China: The Gradual Approach1
Period 123456
Price level 104.3 119.9 135.2 167.2 174.9 216.3
Real GDP 99.0 106.8 115.0 122.9 134.3 143.1
Budget deficit (in percent of GDP) 1.6 0.5 –1.7 –2.3 –4.5 –4.4
Interest rate 5.2 7.2 11.2 13.9 12.8 19.6
Trade balance (in percent of GDP) 11.7 13.1 8.6 7.9 5.5 4.7
Utility of consumer 1 = 102.1, utility of consumer 2 = 100.0
Source: Authors’ simulation results.


















































Table 12. China: Summary Table of Simulations1
Gradual Gradual Immediate Immediate 
Privatization Privatization Privatization Privatization Immediate Gradual 
Gradual Immediate and and Up-Front  and  and Gradual  Tariff  Tariff 
Baseline Privatization Privatization Devaluation Devaluation Devaluation Devaluation Reform Reform Big Bang Gradual
U1 100 102.3 108.5 101.3 100.0 105.9 106.9 101.2 99.1 107.4 102.1
U2 100 90.5 137.3 99.1 89.6 114.2 123.1 101.3 100.6 116.4 100.0
Real GDP  140.3 142.2 146.7 143.6 142.7 147.5 148.2 140.4 140.2 147.7 143.1
Price level  177.6 187.6 188.6 215.5 222.7 226.0 216.6 179.0 178.4 227.0 216.3
Inflation 20.5 21.9 21.5 23.6 22.7 22.2 23.7 23.5 20.1 22.2 23.7
Budget –6.0 –3.9 –5.3 –4.0 –4.0 –5.5 –5.3 –6.4 –6.4 –6.0 –4.4
Interest rate
Nominal 14.8 20.9 27.7 18.9 17.8 24.0 25.0 16.0 15.2 25.4 19.6
Real –5.7 –1.0 6.5 –4.7 –4.9 1.8 1.3 7.5 –4.9 3.2 4.1
External current account  3.8 2.0 1.1 4.8 3.8 2.6 3.7 3.6 3.8 2.6 4.7
Source: Authors’ simulation results.
1Last period, except for U1 and U2,w hich refer to the utility of urban and rural consumers, respectively, over the periods simulated.A piecemeal approach to reform may not only fail to improve overall welfare
significantly but may reduce it. A gradual approach to privatization improves
marginally the welfare of the urban consumer but leads to a sharp deterioration in
the welfare of the rural consumer. Also, a gradual or immediate reduction in tariffs
alone may not result in major welfare improvements. Careful sequencing can
improve welfare, and improper sequencing can lead to welfare losses. An immedi-
ate privatization with a gradual devaluation helps improve welfare more than an
immediate privatization and devaluation or a gradual privatization and devaluation. 
The objective of improving the current account position over a set number of
periods can lead to different results. For example, up-front privatization alone
results in a lower current account position in the last period than an overall grad-
ual package, but maximizes the welfare of both sets of consumers. The catch, of
course, is that the welfare gains may not be sustainable as the external current
account deteriorates further in periods beyond the simulated time frame.
APPENDIX
Consumption
Here, and in what follows, we will use x to denote a demand variable and y to denote a supply
variable. In order to avoid unreadable subscripts, let us let 1 refer to period i and 2 refer to period
i+1. The consumer’s maximization problem is thus:
max U(x), x =( x1,xLu1,xLr1,x2,xLu2,xLr2), (A1)
such that:
(1+ti)Pixi + PLuixLui + PLrixLri + PMixmi + PBixBi + eiPBfixBFi = Ci (A2)
PK2(1– δ)K0 + PA2A0 + PLu2Lu2 + PLr2Lr2 + PM2xM1 + r1xB1 + PB2xB1 + e2PBF2xBF1 + TR2 = N2






Pi = price vector of consumption goods in period i.
xi = vector of consumption in period i.
Ci = value of aggregate consumption in period i (including purchases of financial assets).
Ni = aggregate income in period i (including potential income from the sale of real and
financial assets).
ti = vector of sales tax rates in period i.
PLui = price of urban labor in period i.
Lui = allocation of total labor to urban labor in period i.
xLui = demand for urban leisure in period i.
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478PLri = price of rural labor in period i.
Lri = allocation of total labor to rural labor in period i.
xLri = demand for rural leisure in period i.
a2 = elasticity of rural/urban migration.
PKi = price of capital in period i.
K0 = initial holding of capital.
PAi = price of land in period i.
A0 = initial holding of land.
δ = rate of depreciation of capital.
PMi = price of money in period i. Money in period 1 is the numerator and hence has a
price of 1.
xMi = holdings of money in period i.
PBi = discount price of a certificate of deposit in period i.
πi = domestic rate of inflation in period i.
ri, rFi = domestic and foreign interest rates in period i.
xBi = quantity of bank deposits, that is, CDs in period i.
ei = exchange rate in terms of units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency
in period i.
xBFi = quantity of foreign currency held in period i.
TRi = transfer payments from the government in period i.
di = constants estimated from model simulations.
The left-hand side of equation (A2) represents the value of consumption of goods and
leisure, as well as of financial assets. The next two equations contain the value of the con-
sumer’s holdings of capital and labor, as well as the principal and interest that he receives
from the domestic and foreign financial assets that he held at the end of the previous period.
The equation Ci = Ni then imposes a budget constraint in each period. 
Equation (A3) says that the proportion of savings made up of domestic and foreign
interest-bearing assets depends on relative domestic and foreign interest rates, deflated by the
change in the exchange rate. Equation (A4) is a standard money-demand equation in which the
demand for cash balances depends on the domestic rate of inflation and the value of intended
consumption. 
In period 2 we impose a savings rate based on adoptive expectations, as in equation
(A5). The constants (di) are estimated by a simple regression analysis, based on the previous
periods. Thus if we are in period t,w here t is the end of a two-period segment, then the clo-
sure saving rate for period t is determined by nominal income and the real interest rate. The
constants are updated after each two-period segment by running a regression on the previous
t –2  periods. Thus savings rates are endogenously determined by intertemporal maximiza-
tion in period t,b ut are determined by adoptive expectations in period t +1. 11 Accordingly,
equation (A5) is the terminal condition for the consumer’s problem. Combined with the clo-
sure rule for investment, described in equation (3), this determines the terminal conditions
for our problem.
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11Since the only information the consumer has about the future is the real interest rate, adoptive
expectations is, in this case, equivalent to rational expectations.Andrew Feltenstein and Saleh M.Nsouli
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